Economics at your fingertips  

Asymmetric doupoly competition with innovation spillover and input constraints

You-Hua Chen, Pu-yan Nie and X. Wang ()

Journal of Business Economics and Management, 2015, vol. 16, issue 6, 1124-1139

Abstract: This paper subjects to examine how technology spillover affects input competition and how input constraints impact firm innovation by a two-stage game model and theoretic analysis. The results show that with low spillover, the high cost firm can capture more input than the low cost firm through cost-reducing innovation. Adding input increases firms’ innovation, but it cannot improve the disadvantaged firm's state under input constraint. Compared with non-cooperative innovation, cooperative innovation reduces innovation difference and firm size difference. The research implications are that disadvantage firms could take innovation spillover and capacity constraints as a competition strategy to obtain competition advantage and regulators should stimulate cooperative innovation to higher social welfare. The major value of this paper is that it combines capacity constraints and innovation investment originality.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from

DOI: 10.3846/16111699.2013.823104

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Economics and Management is currently edited by Izolda Joksiene, Romualdas Ginevicius and Ieva Meidute

More articles in Journal of Business Economics and Management from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

Page updated 2023-01-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:jbemgt:v:16:y:2015:i:6:p:1124-1139