The Political foundations of economic development policies

Oskar Kurer

Journal of Development Studies, 1996, vol. 32, issue 5, 645-668

Abstract: The article argues that the adoption and persistence of many failed inward‐looking development strategies can be attributed to political clientelism. A political system consisting of aggregations of patron‐client networks bound together by the exchange of material benefits for political support is liable to be dominated by factionalism, politicisation, a high level of administrative corruption and a low degree of legitimacy and autonomy. In such an environment, welfare‐reducing inward‐looking development strategies result from the attempt to satisfy the demands of political supporters. The analysis suggests that political changes can be a prerequisite to a permanent transition to superior development strategies, and thus to the success of structural reform programmes.

Date: 1996
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00220389608422434 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jdevst:v:32:y:1996:i:5:p:645-668

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/FJDS20

DOI: 10.1080/00220389608422434

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Development Studies is currently edited by Howard White, Oliver Morrissey and Ken Shadlen

More articles in Journal of Development Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().