The political determinants of fiscal policies in the states of India: An empirical investigation

Kausik Chaudhuri and Sugato Dasgupta

Journal of Development Studies, 2006, vol. 42, issue 4, 640-661

Abstract: Using data from the 14 major states of India, we investigate whether state governments' fiscal policy choices are tempered by political considerations. Our principal findings are twofold. First, we show that certain fiscal policies experience electoral cycles: state governments raise less commodity tax revenue, spend less on the current account, and incur larger capital account developmental expenditures in election years than in all other years. Second, we show that coalition state governments raise less own non-tax revenues and spend less on the current account than state governments that are more cohesive in composition. In sum, the dispersion of political power affects government size.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1080/00220380600682116

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