Social Identity and the Formation of Health Insurance Networks

Joachim De Weerdt and Marcel Fafchamps

Journal of Development Studies, 2011, vol. 47, issue 8, 1152-1177

Abstract: In a panel survey of an informal insurance network in Tanzania we find none of the tell-tale signs that insurance transfers follow reciprocal risk sharing arrangements among self-interested individuals: insurance remittances do not occur through informal loans; transfers are not regressive; and they do not fall when shocks are repeated over time. The evidence of unreciprocated transfers occurring between kin is suggestive of risk sharing based on altruism or social norms .

Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (48)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00220388.2010.527952 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jdevst:v:47:y:2011:i:8:p:1152-1177

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/FJDS20

DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2010.527952

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Development Studies is currently edited by Howard White, Oliver Morrissey and Ken Shadlen

More articles in Journal of Development Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().