A Theoretical Perspective on Human Trafficking and Migration-Debt Contracts

Mohammad Abdul Munim Joarder and Paul Miller

Journal of Development Studies, 2013, vol. 49, issue 10, 1332-1343

Abstract: This article develops an economic model of human trafficking and migration-debt contracts. A key feature of the theoretical model is the payment of additional sums beyond the initial contracted price to alter the trafficker's queue order. These bribes are shown to be related to the level of effort applied by the trafficker. The types of data needed to rigorously test the model are discussed, together with policy implications.

Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jdevst:v:49:y:2013:i:10:p:1332-1343

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DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2013.812195

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