Political Connections and Elite Capture in a Poverty Alleviation Programme in India

Sitakanta Panda

Journal of Development Studies, 2015, vol. 51, issue 1, 50-65

Abstract: Political elite capture in public welfare programmes is rife in the low-income countries. Analysing a nationally-representative Indian household survey dataset, we examine the political connections hypothesis and find that a household connected to a local political executive (somebody close or as a family member) vis-�-vis not connected significantly increases the probability of its obtaining an important poverty-alleviating entitlement; that is, a below-poverty-line ration card in all three contexts: national, rural, and urban. This ubiquity of political elite capture at the local government level has guiding policy implications for the beneficiary identification process in the future.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2014.947281

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