Taxes and Bribes in Uganda

Pamela Jagger and Gerald Shively ()

Journal of Development Studies, 2015, vol. 51, issue 1, 66-79

Abstract: Using data from 433 firms operating along Uganda's charcoal and timber supply chains, we investigate patterns of bribe payment and tax collection between supply chain actors and government officials responsible for collecting taxes and fees. We examine the factors associated with the presence and magnitude of bribe and tax payments using a series of bivariate probit and Tobit regression models. We find empirical support for a number of hypotheses related to payments, highlighting the role of queuing, capital-at-risk, favouritism, networks, and role in the supply chain. We also find that taxes crowd in bribery in the charcoal market.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2014.947278

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