Intentions in invisible-hand accounts

Aki Lehtinen

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2009, vol. 16, issue 4, 409-416

Abstract: N. Emrah Aydinonat's account of the invisible-hand is analysed. One of the conditions for unintended social consequences is it requires that individuals' intentions are exclusively directed at the individual level. This condition is weakened in order to accommodate cases in which individuals may also aim at consequences at the social level but the model clearly depicts the invisible hand. Lehtinen's model of counterbalancing strategic votes is proposed as an example that satisfies Aydinonat's conditions, if they are modified as suggested.

Keywords: invisible hand; intentions; mechanisms; counterbalancing; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/13501780903337354

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