Hypotheses non fingo: Problems with the scientific method in economics

J. Farmer

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2013, vol. 20, issue 4, 377-385

Abstract: Although it is often said that economics is too much like physics, to a physicist economics is not at all like physics. The difference is in the scientific methods of the two fields: theoretical economics uses a top down approach in which hypothesis and mathematical rigor come first and empirical confirmation comes second. Physics, in contrast, embraces the bottom up 'experimental philosophy' of Newton, in which 'hypotheses are inferred from phenomena, and afterward rendered general by induction'. Progress would accelerates if economics were to truly make empirical verification the ultimate arbiter of theories, which would force it to open up to alternative approaches.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2013.859408

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