Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games

Lauren Larrouy and Guilhem Lecouteux

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2017, vol. 24, issue 3, 318-343

Abstract: We argue that a Bayesian explanation of strategic choices in games requires introducing a psychological theory of belief formation. We highlight that beliefs in epistemic game theory are derived from the actual choice of the players, and cannot therefore explain why Bayesian rational players should play the strategy they actually chose. We introduce the players’ capacity of mindreading in a game theoretical framework with the simulation theory, and characterise the beliefs that Bayes rational players could endogenously form in games. We show in particular that those beliefs need not be ratifiable, and therefore that rational players can form action-dependent beliefs.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games (2017)
Working Paper: Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games (2017)
Working Paper: Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games (2017)
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DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2017.1335425

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