Voluntary agreements

Cass R. Sunstein

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2021, vol. 28, issue 4, 401-408

Abstract: In philosophy, economics, and law, the idea of voluntary agreements plays a central role. But contractarianism in political philosophy stands (or falls) on altogether different grounds from enthusiasm for contractual ordering in economics and law. Protection of voluntary agreements, and of personal agency, might well be justified on deontological grounds; it should also be supported by welfarists. But when participants in voluntary agreements lack information or suffer from behavioral biases (including adaptive preferences), there is reason to help them, potentially through nudges, mandates, and bans.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2021.1989476

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