Nash meets Samuelson: the comparative-statics interpretation of Nash equilibrium

Marek Hudik

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2023, vol. 30, issue 2, 122-134

Abstract: This paper suggests that Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a conceptual tool for addressing comparative-statics issues on an aggregate level. Together with additional assumptions, Nash equilibrium helps generate testable predictions about changes or differences of behavior induced by changes or differences of exogenous variables. However, Nash-equilibrium behavior, as such, is not subject to empirical testing. Instead, widespread and persistent behavior is modeled as a Nash equilibrium by assumption. The paper argues that this interpretation is in line with the traditional use of an equilibrium concept in price theory. The suggested interpretation is illustrated with the model of public-goods provision. The paper compares this interpretation of Nash equilibrium with other interpretations and discusses its limits.

Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1350178X.2022.2063925 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jecmet:v:30:y:2023:i:2:p:122-134

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RJEC20

DOI: 10.1080/1350178X.2022.2063925

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Methodology is currently edited by John Davis and D Wade Hands

More articles in Journal of Economic Methodology from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().