Incentives and preference reversals: escape moves and community decisions in experimental economics

Timo Tammi

Journal of Economic Methodology, 1999, vol. 6, issue 3, 351-380

Abstract: This article examines the debate on the influence of incentives on the occurrence of the so-called preference reversal phenomenon. Firstly, the participants' views on the issue and the main shifts in the debate are identified. Secondly, the statements of views and the shifts in the debate are analyzed within the framework of 'escape moves (Kitcher 1993). In this analysis the focus is on attempts to resolve particular inconsistencies in the statements and on the ability of proposed solutions to induce a community decision to alter more or less permanently a portion of its established practices. The analysis brings to light the negotiation process in which the significance and meaning of the contested issue is not settled by adopting certain rules in a mechanical way but is worked out by context-dependent interpretations of the community of specialists.

Keywords: experimental economics; Duhemian situation; incentives; negotiations; preference reversals; scope of economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1080/13501789900000023

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