The ramifications of John Searle's social philosophy in economics

Stephan Boehm

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2001, vol. 9, issue 1, 1-10

Abstract: John Searle is well known for his contributions to the philosophy of language and to the philosophy of mind. In recent years he has extended his investigation to focus on the nature of social reality. In particular, he is intrigued by the creation of institutional facts, such as money, marriages and football matches. He postulates three primitive notions - 'collective intentionality', 'the assignment of function' and 'constitutive rules' - that are needed for the construction of institutional reality. The papers and comments making up this symposium are, on the one hand, dealing with Searle's notion of the Background, and on the other hand they are concerned with the ways in which Searle's criticism of various computational theories of the mind may be seen to complement, and to bolster, Hayek's strictures on central economic planning.

Keywords: Consciousness; Cartesian Dualism; Materialism; Social Philosophy; Institutional Facts; Background; Central Economic Planning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/13501780110120073

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