The human agent in behavioural finance: a Searlean perspective

Philip Faulkner

Journal of Economic Methodology, 2001, vol. 9, issue 1, 31-52

Abstract: According to John Searle's theory of human ontology, intentional mental states such as beliefs and wants rely on non-intentional, Background, dispositions to produce rational behaviour. The distinction between intentional and non-intentional states is used as the basis on which to understand the various conceptions of human agency to be found in behavioural finance. The agent of behavioural finance is characterized in terms of three sets of psychological traits: prospect theory, heuristics and mental accounting. These are examined from a Searlean perspective and shown to rely on the interplay between various reflected upon and non-reflected upon elements, in keeping with the Searlean human ontology previously considered. A number of implications are drawn from these findings.

Keywords: John Searle; Intentionality; Behavioural Finance; Prospect Theory; Heuristics; Mental Accounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501780110120091 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jecmet:v:9:y:2001:i:1:p:31-52

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RJEC20

DOI: 10.1080/13501780110120091

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Methodology is currently edited by John Davis and D Wade Hands

More articles in Journal of Economic Methodology from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().