The transitional dynamics of patent reform

Bonwoo Koo

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2009, vol. 12, issue 4, 249-262

Abstract: This study analyzes the dynamic effects of a patent reform in a model of cumulative innovation. It finds that the incentives at different stages of the innovation process are not uniform. The first innovator captures most of producers’ surplus from a policy reform. The high incentive of the first innovator may dominate the potentially negative incentives of subsequent innovations. The optimal patent policy from a dynamic social welfare perspective can be quite different from that of steady‐state social welfare. Concerns about the problems of patent thickets or anti‐commons may not be too serious if dynamic social welfare is considered.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/17487870903326694

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