Political contributions and corruption in the United States

Omer Gokcekus and Sertac Sonan

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2017, vol. 20, issue 4, 360-372

Abstract: The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/17487870.2016.1258312

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