Rethinking the allocation of macroprudential mandates within the Banking Union – a perspective from east of the BU

Katalin Mérő and Dora Piroska

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2018, vol. 21, issue 3, 240-256

Abstract: This paper argues that reforms of the Banking Union should be aimed at increasing efficiency of the single market as well enhance financial stability in the European Union. We argue that this can only be achieved if the Banking Union becomes more accommodative to non-Eurozone Central and Eastern European countries. It can be achieved if within BU institutions, the allocation of competencies reflects the subsidiary demands of CEE governments. Using the example of macroprudential regulation, we develop a number of reform options that could result in the better functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and thus benefit all EU member states.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jecprf:v:21:y:2018:i:3:p:240-256

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DOI: 10.1080/17487870.2017.1400435

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