Consultations and the ECB as prudential regulator: enhancing legitimacy?
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2019, vol. 22, issue 3, 273-290
This paper examines whether the ECB’s consultations, imposed by the SSM Regulation, enhance legitimacy in terms of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, efficacy and judicial accountability. The paper argues that the ECB has, in general, established a solid consultation practice. However, although there is a need for efficacy, the lack of a profound feedback statement, the low participation rate of groups other than the sector actors, and weak judicial review can be considered to constitute its Achilles’ heel. Thus, while in theory the consultation obligation leads to more throughput legitimacy, reality has turned out to be far more complex.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jecprf:v:22:y:2019:i:3:p:273-290
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