Information and Pollution Permit Markets: Another View

David Colander

The Journal of Economic Education, 2006, vol. 37, issue 1, 93-97

Abstract: Abstract : In a recent article, Smith and Yates (2003) argued that regulators could gain additional information about the optimal number of permits to issue from two-sided markets. The author argues that they are incorrect in their assertion because the market they refer to is an asymmetric two-sided market in which individuals are only allowed to decrease the number of permits. When a symmetric two-sided market is considered, the public good nature of the problem makes it unlikely that any useful information can come from a two-sided market.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.3200/JECE.37.1.93-97 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jeduce:v:37:y:2006:i:1:p:93-97

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/VECE20

DOI: 10.3200/JECE.37.1.93-97

Access Statistics for this article

The Journal of Economic Education is currently edited by William Walstad

More articles in The Journal of Economic Education from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().