Policies with varying costs and benefits: A land conservation classroom game

Sahan Dissanayake and Sarah Jacobson

The Journal of Economic Education, 2016, vol. 47, issue 2, 142-160

Abstract: Some policies try to maximize net benefits by targeting different individuals to participate. This is difficult when costs and benefits of participation vary independently, such as in land conservation. The authors share a classroom game that explores cases in which minimizing costs may not maximize benefits and vice versa. The game is a contextually rich pedagogical tool, putting students in the role of landowners who must decide whether to conserve land in different policy environments: flat conservation payments, agglomeration bonuses, and a conservation auction. Students learn about specific issues in land conservation, ecosystem services, preferences for nonmoney outcomes, and general issues in policymaking. The game is suited to classes in environmental, resource, agricultural, and policy economics, and more general classes in microeconomics and public policy.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Policies with Varying Costs and Benefits: A Land Conservation Classroom Game (2015)
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DOI: 10.1080/00220485.2016.1146098

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