Regulatory conflict in the Chicago VOC control program
Joshua Linn (),
Houston Stokes () and
Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2008, vol. 51, issue 4, 561-579
The study analyzes the performance of an innovative cap-and-trade program designed to make cost-effective reductions of an ozone precursor in Chicago and finds that decentralized market incentives were undermined by the continuance of centralized traditional emission point or command-and-control regulation. The study makes two contributions for urban areas considering this regulatory measure: it shows that using two regulatory measures to achieve one emissions reduction goal can undercut cost-effective emissions trading, and it provides a redesign of the market system that coordinates both regulatory measures for cost-effective control and avoidance of trading problems, such as hot spots and inter-temporal spikes.
Keywords: ozone; cap-and-trade; command-and-control; regulatory coordination; cost-effectiveness; VOC redesign (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jenpmg:v:51:y:2008:i:4:p:561-579
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