Community-based incentive coordination in payments for ecosystem services: China’s Wolong Nature Reserve

Jichuan Sheng and Hui Wang

Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, 2025, vol. 68, issue 6, 1213-1237

Abstract: Community-based Payments for Ecosystem Services (CB-PES) have received continued attention because of their ability to help Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) improve local outcomes and sustain community support. This study scrutinizes the role of community-based incentive coordination in PES using the case of China’s Wolong Nature Reserve (WNR). Combining theoretical modeling and empirical analysis of the WNR, this study demonstrates that CB-PES can deploy a range of incentive-coordinated techniques and practices, eventually improving economic outcomes for stakeholders and environmental benefits for society. In addition, this study also highlights the fact that CB-PES aiming to achieve incentive coordination rely on participatory intermediary governance. Finally, designing community-based incentive coordination mechanisms in PES remains challenging, as it also depends on coordinated conservation efforts to optimize the economic outcomes and environmental benefits of PES.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/09640568.2023.2285245

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