An explanation of share tenancy in terms of unemployment, social norms and power

Debarshi Das

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2009, vol. 18, issue 4, 527-540

Abstract: Due to persistent unemployment, peasant families in developing countries tend to employ more labour on the leased in land plots than a capitalist would. In labour surplus societies, therefore, landlords may earn higher surplus from leasing out land than from self-cultivation. By endogenising disguised unemployment this paper shows that greater power and unity of landlords and conservative social norms may explain the persistence of share tenancy in developing economies.

Keywords: tenancy; share tenancy; capitalist farming; Nash equilibrium; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; coalition proof Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/09638190903217651

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