Cross-border political donations and Pareto-efficient tariffs

Masahiro Endoh

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2012, vol. 21, issue 4, 493-512

Abstract: Lobbying activities across international borders could promote international trade policy cooperation because of two distinctive characteristics. First, special interest groups use cross-border donations as tools to wield their influence on ruling parties of other countries directly. Second, cross-border donations make ruling parties take into account the impact of their policy on other countries. They promote efficiency of policy formation. Pareto-efficient tariffs are attained under the conditions that all individuals participate in lobbying activities, ruling parties value the sum of cross-border donations and the sum of domestic gross welfare and domestic donations equally, and contribution schedules are observable to anyone.

Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs (2005)
Working Paper: Cross-Border Political Donations and Pareto-Efficient Tariffs (2005)
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DOI: 10.1080/09638199.2010.512391

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