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Quid pro quo and the enforcement of intellectual property rights protection: A bargaining approach

Dapeng Cai () and Jie Li

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2012, vol. 21, issue 6, 755-772

Abstract: This article models a North--South negotiation where the North provides a quid pro quo in exchange for the strengthening of the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South. We show that when Northern and Southern firms compete on quantity in the Southern market, the South's optimal choice is either complete protection or complete violation, irrespective of different levels of IPR protection being available. We show this to depend on the Southern government's valuation of the quid pro quo and the Northern firm's level of technology.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/09638199.2010.534810

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The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development is currently edited by Pasquale Sgro, David E.A. Giles and Charles van Marrewijk

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