External tariffs under a free-trade area
Patricia Tovar
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2014, vol. 23, issue 5, 656-681
Abstract:
How do free-trade areas affect the tariffs that member countries impose against non-members? There is no consensus in the literature regarding this important question. In this study, we use a political-economy model of endogenous protection to show that if individual preferences exhibit loss aversion or if the government's objective is characterized by diminishing marginal political support, a free-trade area can lead member countries to increase their external tariffs and thus act as a stumbling block to unilateral liberalization. We also argue that the stumbling block result is more likely to arise under loss aversion than under diminishing marginal political support and confirm this using a simulation. Finally, we show that the stumbling block effect can also take place under multilateral liberalization. Our results highlight a new type of mechanism through which preferential trade agreements may affect external tariffs.
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09638199.2013.764920 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:23:y:2014:i:5:p:656-681
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RJTE20
DOI: 10.1080/09638199.2013.764920
Access Statistics for this article
The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development is currently edited by Pasquale Sgro, David E.A. Giles and Charles van Marrewijk
More articles in The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().