Interest-group lobbying for free trade: An empirical case study of international trade policy formation

Klas Rönnbäck

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2015, vol. 24, issue 2, 281-293

Abstract: Many public-choice models have a problem explaining why governments support free trade policies in the face of interest-group lobbying. A common assumption is that interest groups tend to be rent seeking and therefore protectionist. In this empirical case study I find the interest groups to be anti-protectionist. The study shows that many interest groups have a more complex analysis underlying their trade policy preferences than what many public-choice models so far have allowed for.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/09638199.2014.884154

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