Political competition, optimal upstream managerial delegation for an SOE, and optimal downstream industrial policy

Winston Chang, Fang-yueh Chen and Tai-Liang Chen

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2023, vol. 32, issue 3, 391-409

Abstract: This paper introduces political competition into a vertical model with successive duopolies. The upstream consists of a home state-owned enterprise (SOE) and foreign private intermediate-input producer while the downstream consists of home and foreign private final-good producers. The SOE manager lobbies for a better weight configuration comprised of profits and sales, the downstream domestic firm lobbies for more subsidies to enhance its profits and industrial policy, and the policymaker, as one agency, maximizes a weighted sum of the lobbyists' contributions and social welfare, sets policies for the two firms. The paper shows that it is in the interest of the SOE's manager to promote sales at the expense of profits. The upshot on the effects of lobbying is that the government will set too high a weight on sales for the SOE and will confer excessive subsidy to the downstream firm beyond the respective social optimal levels. Lobbying is therefore socially harmful. This paper further shows that if only one lobbyist contributes, which results in lower social welfare than when only its rival contributes, it must be that the lobbyist contributes more than its rival.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/09638199.2022.2113116

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