Optimal tax and debt policy with endogenously imperfect creditworthiness

Joshua Aizenman, Michael Gavin and Ricardo Hausmann

The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 2001, vol. 9, issue 4, 367-395

Abstract: This paper studies the patterns of optimal tax rates and borrowing in a developing country characterized by a costly tax collection. Its access to the international credit market is determined by the efficiency of the tax system, the relative bargaining power of creditors, and the outstanding debt. Country risk modifies considerably the pattern of taxes and borrowing in recessions. The tax rate exhibits strong counter-cyclical patterns in economies operating close to the credit ceiling, whereas the tax rate exhibits very few cyclical patterns in economies operating on the elastic portion of the supply of credit, where country risk factors are absent.

Keywords: Borrowing Constraints; Credit Ceilings; Optimal Tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Working Paper: Optimal Tax and Debt Policy with Endogenously Imperfect Creditworthiness (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jitecd:v:9:y:2001:i:4:p:367-395

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DOI: 10.1080/096381900750056830

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