Corporate News Structure and the Managerial Revolution

David Demers and Debra Merskin

Journal of Media Economics, 2000, vol. 13, issue 2, 103-121

Abstract: Critics contend that corporate news organizations are destroying democracy because they place more emphasis on profits than on information diversity and other nonprofit goals considered crucial for creating or maintaining a political democracy. Research shows that corporate news organizations tend to be more profitable than entrepreneurial news organizations; however, they actually place less emphasis on profits and more on product quality and other nonprofit goals. More importantly, the "critical corporate model" appears to contain a logical flaw, the "approved contradiction," which claims that professional managers should maximize profits more than the owners. This claim contradicts the managerial revolution hypothesis that expects corporate organizations to place less emphasis on profits as power and control in modern organizations shifts from the owners to professional managers and technocrats. This article reviews the managerial revolution hypothesis and concludes that attempts to dismiss it outright are premature.

Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327736ME1302_4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jmedec:v:13:y:2000:i:2:p:103-121

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/HMEC20

DOI: 10.1207/S15327736ME1302_4

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Media Economics is currently edited by Nodir Adilov

More articles in Journal of Media Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().