Advertising and Media Market Concentration

Jonas Häckner () and Sten Nyberg

Journal of Media Economics, 2008, vol. 21, issue 2, 79-96

Abstract: In media markets, the value of advertisement exposure depends on circulation, and media consumers' valuation is affected by advertising. This article analyzes media market competition in a duopoly framework. There exist symmetric and asymmetric equilibria in terms of firm size, and sometimes a natural monopoly may emerge. There is less scope for asymmetry when products are more differentiated. Some media exhibit public good features. This increases the scope for asymmetry when consumers value advertising positively. If their valuation is negative, only symmetric equilibria exist. Regulations limiting price competition increase the scope for natural monopoly.

Date: 2008
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Working Paper: Price Competition, Advertising and Media Market Concentration (2000)
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DOI: 10.1080/08997760802069861

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