 Price Discrimination and Audience Composition in Advertising-Based BroadcastingJournal of Media Economics, 2008, vol. 21, issue 4, 234-257 Abstract: In this article, a model is introduced that has 2 distinguishing features. First, the multidimensional nature of competition in media markets characterized by free access and advertising is acknowledged, through explicit modeling of vertical and horizontal differentiation. Second, the price of advertising depends on the expected audience composition, not simply on its magnitude, and the amount of price discrimination. It is found that market equilibria depend on a number of critical factors: the amount and type of price discrimination in advertising, the correlation between formats and audience composition, the relative profitability of the different market segments, and diseconomies of scale in program quality. For a variety of market structures, the ability to discriminate on the price of advertising encourages a higher level of quality in broadcast media. Date: 2008 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jmedec:v:21:y:2008:i:4:p:234-257 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/08997760802544749 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Media Economics is currently edited by Nodir Adilov More articles in Journal of Media Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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