Profitably Bundling Information Goods: Evidence From the Evolving Video Library of Netflix

Scott Hiller ()

Journal of Media Economics, 2017, vol. 30, issue 2, 65-81

Abstract: Using a unique dataset of the Netflix video on demand library, this article measures the characteristics of information goods important when employing a strategic bundling strategy. By matching the titles entering and exiting the library to their relevant properties, I use a characteristic approach to determine when the value to Netflix of adding a title exceeds the licensing fee and when the displacement effect associated with presence in the library dictates that the title will not be offered. Results show that titles of median commercial success are bundled more frequently than the most and least successful, and the number of similar films exiting the library is important to how likely a film is to enter, indicating strategic bundling. These results are generalizable to the streaming video industry and any information goods with rapidly diminishing marginal utility.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1080/08997764.2017.1375507

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