Regulation and corruption in transitional China

Xiaobing Wang

Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 2019, vol. 17, issue 1, 47-64

Abstract: This paper addresses the relationship between institutional change, regulation, and corruption by examining two possible positive effects of government discretion on growth in transitional economies, such as China. Firstly, economic reform depends on the support of those who have economic power. Allowing government departments and officials to divert resources and to be involved in private businesses make them a driving force for reform by giving up some of their power to the market. Secondly, because there existed large amounts of inefficient or out-of-date regulations in transitional economies, certain types of government discretion can actually circumvent inefficient policies and regulations and thus support growth. They enable people to break the status quo when regulations are lagging behind the reform. Although China had many laws and regulations which did not particularly promote growth, positive effects of government discretionary behaviour may have offset the negative effects of these laws and regulations on growth.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/14765284.2019.1588594 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jocebs:v:17:y:2019:i:1:p:47-64

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RCEA20

DOI: 10.1080/14765284.2019.1588594

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies is currently edited by Professor Xiaming Liu

More articles in Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().