Central bank independence, inflation and political instability in developing countries

Jakob de Haan and Clemens L.J. Siermann

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 1996, vol. 1, issue 2, 135-147

Abstract: We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.

Date: 1996
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DOI: 10.1080/13841289608523360

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