Innovative behavioral regulatory agencies as second generation commitment devices

Francesc Trillas

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2020, vol. 23, issue 1, 83-99

Abstract: This article analyzes how the commitment problem in economic regulation, and a solution based on strategic delegation, are affected by the non-standard rationality of agents that participate in the regulatory interaction. As a result, on the one hand, independent regulators are seen as part of a potentially more robust innovative regulatory system, and, on the other hand, their contribution to this system can be based on a wider range of instruments. Second generation commitment mechanisms that take this into account may be a key ingredient of reforms in the regulation of those industries that require a long run perspective.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/17487870.2019.1609358

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