The effectiveness of conditionality and the political economy of policy reform: is it simply a matter of political will?

Graham Bird

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 1998, vol. 2, issue 1, 89-113

Abstract: Although widely used by international financial institutions, policy conditionality often fails in the sense that countries do not fully implement it. Up to now most research has focused on the design of conditionality. This paper, however, uses political economy analysis to address the issue of non-compliance. Either governments agree to conditions with little intention of carrying them through, or circumstances change the benefit-cost ratio of compliance. Analysis of these circumstances points to ways in which conditionality might usefully be reformed.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13841289808523375 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:jpolrf:v:2:y:1998:i:1:p:89-113

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GPRE19

DOI: 10.1080/13841289808523375

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Policy Reform is currently edited by Dr Judith Clifton

More articles in Journal of Economic Policy Reform from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().