Incentives and corruption in chinese economic reform

Chengze Simon Fan and Herschel Grossman

Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2001, vol. 4, issue 3, 195-206

Abstract: This paper argues that, given the legacy of Chinese communism and its political structure, corruption, together with the threat of punishment for corruption and the selective enforcement of this threat, serves as a method of compensation that both satisfies the political objectives of the Communist Party and provides an effective inducement to local officials to promote economic reform.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/13841280108523419

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