The Political Economy of Bank Reform in Argentina Under Convertibility
Lee Alston and
Andres Gallo ()
Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 2002, vol. 5, issue 1, 1-16
We provide an analytical narrative of the political and economic causes and consequences of institutional changes in the Argentine banking system. We devote most of our attention to the privatization of the provincial banks. Our story differs from the prevailing wisdom in its stress on the key roles played by convertibility and an independent Central Bank rather than the Fondo Fiduciario (Fiduciary Fund).
Keywords: E42; E52; E58; E63; G21; G28; G38; H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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