A game-theoretic analysis of competition among container port hubs: the case of Busan and Shanghai 1

Christopher M. Anderson, Yong-An Park, Young-Tae Chang, Chang-Ho Yang, Tae-Woo Lee and Meifeng Luo

Maritime Policy & Management, 2008, vol. 35, issue 1, 5-26

Abstract: Countries throughout the world, and especially within Asia, are investing heavily in container port infrastructure in the hopes of capturing a larger share of global shipping activity for their economies. Many existing ports are emphasizing developing the capacity to serve as a hub port, building deepwater berths with large terminals to facilitate transfer of containers from feeder ships to mother ships for intercontinental transport. We develop a game-theoretic best response framework for understanding how competitor ports will respond to development at a focus port, and whether the focus port will be able to capture or defend market share by building additional capacity. We apply this model to investment and competition currently occurring between the ports of Busan and Shanghai.

Date: 2008
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DOI: 10.1080/03088830701848680

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