Managing port concessions: evidence from Italy

Francesco Parola, Alessio Tei and Claudio Ferrari

Maritime Policy & Management, 2011, vol. 39, issue 1, 45-61

Abstract: With the adoption of the landlord port model, the assignment of port areas to private operators has become a key point for the efficient management of port spaces as well as of port activities themselves. The paper investigates the procedural process that leads to the assignment of port concessions in Italy. The survey is conducted on a sample of ports and covers the last decade, focusing on some relevant decision-making and managerial variables (concession type and duration, criteria for the determination of fees, etc.). Despite the relatively small size of the sample, it highlights the different policies adopted by the Port Authorities (PAs) in order to attract private operators or enhance the development of port infrastructure. Moreover, the paper discusses how concession fees influence the total earnings of PAs and the extent to which they may be used in pursuit of ports’ economic and social goals.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/03088839.2011.642312

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