An examination of some problems with international law governing maritime piracy

Paul Hallwood and Thomas J. Miceli

Maritime Policy & Management, 2013, vol. 40, issue 1, 65-79

Abstract: We describe the capture-to-ransom pirate business model, which is proving very successful against merchant shipping, even though the latter enjoys the protection of naval warships. We argue that failure to adequately enforce international law is symptomatic of inherent weaknesses in that law: namely that as “cooperation” between States Parties (Article 100 of the Law of the Sea ) is undefined, investment in enforcement by multiple-enforcement agents is left open to free riding problems. We end with an investigation of some suggestions for reforming international law against maritime piracy, but we are skeptical of meaningful progress for several years.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/03088839.2012.743685

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