Dynamics of Mixed Coalitions Under Social Cohesion Constraints
Giuseppe De Marco and
Mathematical Population Studies, 2006, vol. 13, issue 1, 39-62
The performance to a collective task may require a certain degree of cooperation among agents. Is cooperation viable in the sense that individual needs are fulfilled, compromises are possible and the task is performed? A model of cooperation is presented in which compromises are also ruled by cohesion among agents. Viability conditions are found associated with regulation law. They say that cooperation increases with cohesion. Moreover, reducing the rapidity of change of cooperation and lowering dissident behavior correct the dynamics so as to turn non viable states into viable ones.
Keywords: dynamic cooperative game; majority game; mixed coalition; cohesion constraint; viability theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Mathematical Population Studies is currently edited by Prof. Noel Bonneuil, Annick Lesne, Tomasz Zadlo, Malay Ghosh and Ezio Venturino
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