Who makes the pie bigger? An experimental study on co-opetition

Juan Lacomba, Francisco Lagos and Tibor Neugebauer

New Zealand Economic Papers, 2011, vol. 45, issue 1-2, 59-68

Abstract: The tension between cooperation and competition that characterizes many business relationships is experimentally studied in a 'pie'-creation game; value is created and increased through cooperation in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. At the end, the player with the greater stake in the joint pie decides on the division of the pie. Three treatments of the pie-creation game are considered: in the first treatment, rivals create the pie; in the second, non-rivals create the pie; finally, in the third, the pie is created by subjects who do not know about the future pie-division. The data show that the competition for the right to split the pie biases behaviors towards defection when subjects play with their rival.

Keywords: competition; cooperation; co-opetition; ambiguously repeated prisoner's dilemma; experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/00779954.2011.556070

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