Do separation rules matter? An experimental study of commitment

Filip Vesely, Vivian Lei and Scott Drewianka

New Zealand Economic Papers, 2011, vol. 45, issue 1-2, 97-117

Abstract: Coasian reasoning predicts that the conditions under which parties may terminate a partnership will affect bargaining between partners, but not the durability of partnerships. This paper endeavors to test both predictions in an experimental setting that allows agents to form and end partnerships endogenously and to bargain over resources. We find that separation rules have less effect on bargaining than predicted by theory, but larger effects on partnership stability. Perhaps surprisingly, agents who are weaker relative to their partners are more successful when either party can end a partnership unilaterally than when both must consent to a separation.

Keywords: separation rule; commitment; bargaining; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00779954.2011.556073 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:45:y:2011:i:1-2:p:97-117

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RNZP20

DOI: 10.1080/00779954.2011.556073

Access Statistics for this article

New Zealand Economic Papers is currently edited by Dennis Wesselbaum

More articles in New Zealand Economic Papers from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().