 Distinguished fellow lecture: monetary policy and the benefits and limits of central bank independenceNew Zealand Economic Papers, 2023, vol. 57, issue 3, 263-289 Abstract: Central bank independence is an important development in macroeconomics. It has become a lynchpin of modern central banking. The period since the Global Financial Crisis and the experience of the COVID-19 pandemic era posed new challenges for central banks, with potential implications for central bank independence. This paper reviews the scope and rationale for central bank independence and the reasons it spread internationally after the 1980s. It reviews evidence of the effects of central bank independence on inflation, output volatility, financial stability and fiscal policy. The paper considers political threats and contemporary policy issues that could influence the form of central bank independence and credibility. These issues include matters relating to assessments of monetary policy during the pandemic, the scope of central bank mandates, interpretations of inflation dynamics, the funding of central bank operations, and the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy. Date: 2023 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:57:y:2023:i:3:p:263-289 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/00779954.2023.2234811 Access Statistics for this article New Zealand Economic Papers is currently edited by Dennis Wesselbaum More articles in New Zealand Economic Papers from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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