Social Organization, Civic Responsibility and Collective Action: Game Theory Models of Community Participation in Development Projects

Howard White

Oxford Development Studies, 2003, vol. 31, issue 2, 149-158

Abstract: Why do people participate in community projects? Game theory approaches based on the prisoners' dilemma suggest that people will not participate even if they would have been better off had they all done so. This paper adapts an argument of Bates to show how a system of enforceable fines can ensure full participation. It then goes on to present a model in which individuals have differing degrees of civic responsibility, so that some will participate whilst others free-ride. Other idiosyncratic elements in the individual cost-benefit calculation for community projects, such as unequal benefits, can also explain why some participate but others do not. But the size of the initiating group has to be above a threshold level for the project to take place at all. External agents can encourage collective action by lowering the cost-benefit ratio facing individuals.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600810307425 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:oxdevs:v:31:y:2003:i:2:p:149-158

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CODS20

DOI: 10.1080/13600810307425

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Development Studies is currently edited by Jo Boyce and Frances Stewart

More articles in Oxford Development Studies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().