Explaining informal payments for health services in Central and Eastern Europe: an institutional asymmetry perspective

Colin Williams and Adrian V. Horodnic

Post-Communist Economies, 2018, vol. 30, issue 4, 440-458

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to propose and evaluate a new institutional theory explanation for patients making informal payments for health services in Central and Eastern Europe. This views informal payments by patients to healthcare professionals as arising when formal institutional failures lead to an asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten rules of informal institutions. Reporting a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of the prevalence of informal payments by patients in Central and Eastern European countries, a strong association is revealed between the level of asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions, and the propensity to make informal payments. The association between informal payments and various formal institutional imperfections is then explored to evaluate which structural conditions might reduce this institutional asymmetry, and thus the propensity to make informal payments. The paper concludes by exploring the implications for tackling such informal practices.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/14631377.2018.1442051

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