Upfront versus staged financing: the role of verifiability
Dongsoo Shin () and
Sungho Yun ()
Quantitative Finance, 2014, vol. 14, issue 6, 1069-1078
We compare upfront and staged financing to see when and how one financing policy prevails over the other. In our model, there are two moral hazard problems that interact with each other. First, the entrepreneur may pursue his own private benefit out of the raised fund in the initial period. Second, the entrepreneur may shirk on project evaluation at the refinancing stage if the project is stage-financed. When the entrepreneur's effort for project evaluation is verifiable, the project may be stage-financed even if the cost of evaluating effort exceeds the value of information (over-evaluation). When such effort is unverifiable, the project may be financed upfront even if the value of information exceeds the cost of evaluating effort (under-evaluation).
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